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A Judicial Approach to Executive Foreign Affairs 
Powers: The Road Not Taken in Regan v. Wald 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A tension exists in the United States between the need for the executive to be 
preeminent in matters of foreign affairs and the lack of any expressly granted 
foreign affairs powers in the Constitution. l This tension has affected the manner 
in which the government's legislative and judicial branches respond to the 
president's foreign affairs power. Congress responds to this tension by trying to 
accommodate two mutually exclusive goals: providing the president with flexibil-
ity and discretion in international crises, while simultaneously attempting to 
ensure presidential accountability to Congress.2 Similarly, the judiciary strives to 
provide the executive with sufficient power to respond to international crises and 
direct foreign policy, but also seeks to preserve the system of checks and balances 
on the president's actions in foreign affairs.3 
Courts resolve the tension by using one of two different approaches to the 
problem. Under the first approach, the delegation-of-powers approach, the 
courts lower the standard needed to find a congressional delegation of power 
when foreign affairs are involved} The second approach, the scope-of-
inherent-powers approach, has been used only when a court cannot find a 
congressional delegation of power under the delegation approach:; Under the 
scope-of-inherent powers approach, a court will readily find that Congress 
interpreted the Constitution as granting the president broad foreign affairs 
powers.6 The two approaches are distinguishable in that, under the delegation-
of-powers approach, Congress is delegating its power to the president; while 
under the scope-of-inherent-powers approach, Congress is acquiescing to the 
president'S own inherent constitutional power. 
Courts implement the delegation-of-powers approach by allowing the presi-
dent very broad discretion in interpreting enabling statutes which involve for-
eign affairs.1 If Congress fails to object to the president's interpretation, courts 
may find that Congress has acquiesced to the executive's version of the statute.s 
l. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972). 
2. Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's Crisis Power with the Need for 
Accountability, 55 S. CAL. REV. 1453 (1978). 
3. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
4. See infra notes 91-126 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 127-45 and accompanying text. 
6. /d. 
7. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text. 
8. /d. 
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Conversely, the courts implement the scope-of-inherent-powers approach by 
giving the president broad discretion in interpreting the inherent powers 
granted to the executive in the ConstitutionY The courts interpret congressional 
silence in the face of this claimed power as congressional' approval,lo 
These two judicial approaches have three effects. First, they put the burden on 
Congress to prohibit presidential actions and to circumscribe presidential power 
more explicitly. Second, they put courts in the more comfortable role of inter-
preting congressional will rather than deciding the constitutional balance of 
power. Finally, they allow the court to avoid the problem of creating new 
inherent powers in the executive. 
In Regan v. Wald, 11 the Supreme Court was confronted with the dilemma of 
providing the president flexibility in foreign affairs without creating new inher-
ent powers in the executive. The case arose from a challenge to the Treasury 
Department's restrictions on travel to CubaY The controversy centered around 
the issue of whether the Treasury Department had the authority under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose travel restric-
tions.'3 The First Circuit below had invalidated the restrictions. It held that since 
the President acted without following the procedure prescribed by Congress in 
the IEEP.( it could only sustain the President's authority to impose the restric-
tions by disabling Congress from acting upon the subject.14 Since the Court could 
not disable Congress from acting in this area, it invalidated the President's 
restrictions on travel to Cuba. lo 
The Wald case presented the Supreme Court with a difficult situation. The 
Court has always maintained a policy of avoiding decisions which would unduly 
restrict the president's ability to direct our nation's foreign policy. The executive 
branch, however, conceded that it did not follow the procedures prescribed by 
the IEEPA.16 This failure to follow procedures precluded the court from finding 
a delegation of power,l7 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 majority, avoided this dilemma by finding 
that the restrictions on travel to Cuba were grand fathered when the IEEPA was 
passed. Consequently, he found the president's authority to restrict travel to 
9. See Youngstown Sheet &:Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson,J., concur-
ring); Dames &: Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981). 
10. See irifra notes 127-45 and accompanying text. 
11. 52 U.S.L.W. 4966 (U.S. June 16, 1984). 
12.1d. 
13.ld. 
14. 708 F.2d 794, 800 (1st Cir. 1983). This reasoning was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1402 (11th Cir. 1983) (convictions of persons involved in the Cuban Boat 
Lift of May, 1980, overturned on grounds that the travel restrictions to Cuba were invalid under the 
IEEPA for failure to follow procedure). 
15. Wald, 708 F.2d 794, 800. 
16. Id. at 797. 
17. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. 
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Cuba came under the Trading with the Enemies Act (TWEA) and was not 
restricted by the IEEPA.IH 
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun compiled numerous excerpts from the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD showing that Congress did not intend to grandfather travel 
restrictions to Cuba. 19 In fact, Blackmun accused the court of ignoring clear 
legislative intent in order to achieve its desired result.~o 
This Comment is neither a case note on Regan v. Wald nor an analysis of 
whether travel restrictions to Cuba were grand fathered by the IEEPA. Rather, it 
is an examination of another possible analysis the court could have taken to 
achieve the same result. By taking the scope-of-inherent-powers approach, the 
court could still have allowed Congress to have the primary role in defining 
executive power. The advantage to this approach, however, is that a minor 
procedural defect would not prohibit the president'S action as it would under a 
delegation approach. 
A court using the scope-of-inherent-powers approach would determine 
whether Congress approved or disapproved of the president'S use of his inher-
ent power. The executive's inherent powers would expand or contract relative to 
congressional approval or disapproval of the action.~l In determining this, the 
court would examine all factors which would indicate Congress' intent. The 
court would then balance those factors indicating congressional support of the 
president'S action with those indicating congressional disfavor with the presi-
dent's action. The court then would determine whether Congress approved of 
the president's use of his inherent power and would expand or contract that 
power relative to Congress' approval or disapprovaU~ 
This Comment studies both approaches courts can take in resolving the 
dilemma presented by the Wald case. Section II analyzes presidential powers 
inherent in the Constitution and the court's policy of providing the president 
great discretion in foreign atlairs. Sections III and IV discuss the delegation-
of-powers approach and the scope-of-inherent-powers approach, which the 
courts use to implement their policy of promoting a strong executive in foreign 
affairs. Finally, this Comment applies the delegation-of-powers and scope-of-in-
here nt-powers approaches to the facts of the Wald case without the grandfather 
clause. The author concludes that, although Congress cannot be found to have 
delegated the disputed power to the president, it did acquiesce to the president's 
claimed inherent power. 
18. Wald, 52 U.S.L.W. 4966. 4972 (U.S. June 26, 1984). 
19. !d. at 4972-77 (B1ackmun, J., dissenting). 
20. ld. at 4975. 
21. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 334-55 (1952). 
22. See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text. 
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II. INHERENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE 
A. Sources of Inherent Powers 
The Constitution enumerates few presidential powers for the conduct of 
foreign policy.~3 The president is empowered to make treaties with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.24 The president is also empowered to appoint and 
receive ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls with the advice and consent 
of the Senate.~5 The Constitution designates the president as the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces.~6 Other presidential powers are implied from the 
language of Articles I and II of the ConstitutionP 
The president possesses not only enumerated powers but also powers implied 
from the "executive powers."~H The president's power to recognize and maintain 
diplomatic relations with foreign countries has been implied from the constitu-
tionally granted power to receive ambassadors.29 The commander-in-chief clause 
has led to the implied executive power to use military force to protect national 
interests.3o Finally, the clause empowering the president to "take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed"31 has been a basis for presidential actions to ensure 
that treaty provisions are carried out and to justify intervention in foreign 
conflicts under international law. 
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Inherent Presidential Powers 
The courts, through interpretation of the Constitution, have further extended 
the president's foreign affairs power. The broadest interpretation of the execu-
23. HENKIN, supra note I, at 37. 
24. U.S. CaNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at cl. I. 
27. The language of articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution has led to further implied presidential 
powers. Article I grants Congress "[alII legislative powers herein granted." U.S. CONST. art. I, § I 
(emphasis added). In contrast, article II begins, "The executive powers shall be vested in a president of 
the United States of America." U.S. CaNST. art. II, §. I. The implication of this language is that the 
president is not limited to the powers that are expressly enumerated, but rather that he has been 
granted all of the "executive powers." Congress, however, can only exercise those powers which the 
Constitution specifically grants. 
This argument was first advanced by Alexander Hamilton in the debate between "Pacificus" and 
"Helvidius." See HENKIN, supra note I, at 42. The debate between "Pacificus" (Hamilton) and "Hel-
vidius" (James Madison) is set forth in E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
179-81 (4th ed. 1957). 
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also HENKIN, supra note I, at 37. Recognition or non-recognition of 
foreign countries is an executive act that has international and domestic importance. For example, a 
recognized sovereign power has access to the federal courts. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398,408-12 (1964); see also Note, Iranian Assets and Claims Settlement Agreements: A Study of Presiden-
tial Foreign Relations Power, 56 TuL. L. REv. 1364, 1367 n. 20 (1982). 
30. The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. IV 1980), was a response to the growth 
of presidential power in this area. 
31. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 3. 
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tive's foreign affairs power is Justice Sutherland's opinion in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp .3~ 
In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court created an extra-constitutional source of 
inherent presidential power. The Curtiss-Wright case arose from the sale of arms 
to Bolivia despite a presidential boycott of arms sales to that country. After 
finding a valid congressional delegation of authority for the president to impose 
the Bolivian boycott, the Court noted in dicta that the president possessed 
extra-constitutional powers in the area of foreign affairs.33 
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority in Curtiss-Wright, stated that the 
federal government in general, and the president in particular, have greater 
power in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs.34 The powers of the federal 
government are not limited by the Constitution because the Constitution in-
volves only those powers that the original thirteen colonies delegated to the 
federal government.3S The foreign affairs power, however, was not delegated by 
the individual colonies. Rather, it originated as a direct grant from the British 
Crown to the federal government itself. 36 Since the foreign affairs power came 
from the Crown rather than the states, the president was not restricted by the 
express language of the Constitution when acting in foreign affairs.37 
Sutherland argued that the foreign affairs power is vested in the president 
rather than the legislature.38 The basis for this argument was that the "[p]resi-
dent is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole represen-
tative with foreign nations."39 The unique position of the president in foreign 
affairs allows him more discretion than he possesses in domestic affairs.40 Thus, 
the Curtiss-Wright Court concluded that the president has inherent foreign af-
fairs powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.41 
The president's position as the representative of the United States in interna-
tional affairs has made courts reluctant to find that he exceeded his authority 
when acting in foreign affairs.4~ For example, the Supreme Court in Chicago and 
32. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
33. ld. at 316-17. 
34. ld. at 316. 
35. ld. 
36. ld. at 316-17. See generally HENKIN, supra note I, at 19-20. 
37. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
38. ld. at 319. 
39.ld. 
40. Id. at 320-21. 
41. ld. at 318. See also Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (presidential foreign affairs 
power penn its executive regulation of Iranian student visas); Chicago Be Southern Airlines v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (Supreme Court refused to examine an executive order granting 
an overseas air route, recognizing that the president may exercise not only the commerce authority 
delegated to him by Congress, but also an independent foreign affairs power); HENKIN, supra note I, at 
210. Ste generally Note, Settlnnent of the Iranian Hostage Crisis: An Exercise of Constitutional and Statutory 
Executive Prerogative in Foreign Affairs, 13 INT'L L. Be POL. 993, 1005 (1981). 
42. Note, supra note 41, at 1031. 
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Southern Airlines v. Waterman Steam Ship Corp.,43 held that the judiciary should not 
review the president's decisions involving the licensing of international airiinesY 
The Court's rationale for not reviewing the presidential decision was that the 
president, as the nation's representative in foreign affairs, has intelligence in-
formation which should be kept secret.45 The Court felt it should not examine 
this information or attempt to decide the issue without such information.46 The 
Court does not consider itself the appropriate forum for issues involving foreign 
policy}7 
In Goldwater v. Carter,48 the Supreme Court clarified its policy regarding the 
proper role of the judiciary in foreign affairs issues. In order to normalize 
relations with the People's Republic of China, President Carter terminated a 
U.S.!Taiwanese defense treaty. Senator Barry Goldwater challenged the Presi-
dent's ability to terminate a treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate.49 
Justice Rehnquist held that the political question doctrine50 precluded the Court 
from deciding this issue. Citing Curtiss-Wright, Rehnquist based his holding on 
the fact that the decision to terminate the treaty was a foreign policy matter,5! 
and that the Constitution is silent as to the method of terminating treaties. 52 
Rehnquist noted that Congress "has a variety of powerful tools for influencing 
foreign policy decisions that bear on treaty matters."53 The judiciary should not, 
in effect, usurp Congress' role. 54 
43. 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
44. Id. at 114. 
45. Id. at 111. 
46.Id. 
47. Id. 
48. 444 U.S. 960, 996 (1979). 
49. Id. at 1005 (Rehnquist, j., concurring). 
50. The political question doctrine of judicial restraint states that the court will not hear political 
questions because their determination would encroach upon the executive or legislative powers. 
The Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), fashioned the following test to determine 
if the political question doctrine should be invoked: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standard for resolving it; or the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or 
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of 
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id. at 217. 
51. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005 (1979). 
52.Id. 
53. Id. at 1004 n.1. 
54. Id. The courts are more comfortable enforcing Congress' objection to presidential power than 
limiting the power themselves. Comment, Illumination or Elimination of the "Zone of Twilight~" Con-
gressional Acquiescence and Presidential Authority in Foreign Affairs, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 113-16 (1982). 
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C. The Influence oj Curtiss-Wright 
While courts are unwilling to restrict the president's power without con-
gressional direction, they are equally unwilling to give it judicial approval.5.> 
Justice Jackson, in Korematsu v. United States,56 articulated this policy by stating 
that it is better to let unconstitutional executive emergency actions stand rather 
than have a judicial opinion try to rationalize the illegal act, because the illegal act 
ends with the emergency but the judicial interpretation "lies about like a loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need."57 The Court fears that precedents they establish for 
emergency circumstances will be misused in later unforeseen situations. 
The case of Haig v. Agee5~ exemplifies the Supreme Court's reluctance to rely 
on implied inherent presidential powers as a means of providing the president 
flexibility in foreign affairs.59 In Agee, the Court suggested that the president's 
discretionary authority over passport issuance was inherent. In support of this 
proposition, the Court cited Curtiss-Wright's language on the "delicate, plenary 
and exclusive power of the president."60 In its holding, however, the Court did 
not rely on an inherent presidential power to issue passports,61 but rather, relied 
on an implied congressional authorization6~ for the president to withhold 
passports for national security reasons.63 
Although courts are reluctant to rely on implied inherent powers to justify a 
presidential action, they are still influenced by Curtiss-Wright in cases involving 
foreign affairs.64 This influence does not take the form of court created plenary 
inherent powers in the executive. Rather, it takes the form of an increased 
willingness by the courts to either find a congressional delegation of power to the 
executive, or to find congressional approval of the executive's interpretation of 
presidential powers in the Constitution.65 The tests the courts use to implement 
both of these approaches originated in the 1952 case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer.66 
55. Comment, supra note 54, at 113-14. 
56. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
57. /d. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
58. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). 
59. Comment, supra note 54, at 113. 
60. Agee, 453 U.S. at 240 n.21. 
61. Comment, supra note 54, at 113. 
62. The Court found that Congress had approved the Secretary's withholding of passports for 
national security reasons because it failed 10 object to the State Department's policy on passport denial. 
Agee, 453 U.S. at 300-0 I. 
63. [d. 
64. See infra notes 91-126 and accompanying text. 
65. The first of these approaches is the delegation-of-powers approach. The second of these ap-
proaches is the scope-of-inherent-powers approach. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
66. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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III. YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. V. SAWYER 
The Youngstown case arose from President Truman's seizure of the nation's 
steel mills in order to avert a nationwide strike and thus avoid possible harm to 
the Korean War effort.67 The President claimed authority for his actions under 
his own inherent powers.68 The steel companies filed suit on the grounds that 
neither the Constitution nor Congress authorized the president to seize the steel 
mills.69 In fact, Congress had expressly rejected delegating to the president the 
power to seize property in emergency situations.70 The government argued, 
however, that because the President was using his inherent powers, he did not 
need to consult Congress or seek its approval.71 
The Court found that neither the executive's authority as commander-in-
chief nor his authority to faithfully execute the law gives him the "ultimate 
power ... to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes 
from stopping production."n The majority opinion apparently rejected the 
Curtiss-Wright concept of broad inherent powers in the executive.73 Four of the 
six-member majority, however, wrote concurrences which argued that the presi-
dent does possess certain implied powers.H 
Justice jackson's concurrence has been the most influential in subsequent 
analyses of inherent presidential power.75 Justice Jackson did not view inherent 
presidential powers as broadly as did Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright,76 nor 
did he believe executive power should be rigidly limited to those powers enum-
erated in the Constitution. 77 Instead, Jackson viewed the scope of presidential 
powers as flexible "depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those 
of Congress."78 
Justice Jackson's opinion provides an analytical framework for determining 
the scope of presidential powers. Jackson outlined three categories of presiden-
tial action: 79 
67. Id. at 582. 
68. Id. President Truman claimed inherent emergency authority and authority as commander-in-
chief of the armed forces. 
69. Id. at 583. 
70. Id. at 586. 
71. Id. at 584. 
72. Id. at 587. 
73. Curtiss-Wright is of doubtful precedential value in Youngstown because Curtiss-Wright involved 
purely foreign affairs, whereas Youngstown involved predominantly domestic affairs. Compare Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 315, with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582. 
74. Comment, supra note 54, at 98. 
75. Note, TM National Emergency Dilemmas: Balancing tM Executive's Crisis Powers with tM Need for 
Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1494 (1979). 
76. Youngstown SMet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 640. 
77. Id. 
78. /d. at 635. 
79. Jackson admitted that the categories are "over-simplified groupings of practical situations." Id. 
The limited value of these groupings was also noted by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). 
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(1) [W]hen the [p]resident acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
can delegate ... ; 
(2) When the [p]resident acts in absence of either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own indepen-
dent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain ... ; 
(3) When the [p]resident takes measures incompatible with the ex-
pressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for 
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter .... 80 
189 
The practical effect of Jackson's framework is that if the president acts pur-
suant to the will of Congress, the Supreme Court will view his powers broadly.HI 
If the president acts against the will of Congress, the Supreme Court will strictly 
scrutinize his powers.82 In the latter case, the president's powers are restricted to 
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution.83 Thus, after Youngstown, the 
Court would not focus on whether the president has the necessary inherent 
power to perform a particular act but whether he was acting in accordance with, 
or against, the will of Congress.84 To determine this, the court analyzes the 
extent to which Congress approved of the president's actions.85 Jackson'S con-
currence, therefore, provides a framework for analyzing whether Congress has 
authorized the president's use of his inherent powers.86 
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Youngstown is the origin of the 
delegation-of-powers approach for ascertaining the executive's foreign affairs 
power.87 Frankfurter reasoned that Congress can be held to have acquiesced in 
80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 635-38. 
81. Id. at 635. 
82. Id. at 638. 
83. Id. Jackson felt that when the president's acts contravene the will of Congress, the executive 
should be limited only to those powers mentioned in the Constitution. He did not believe, however, that 
the express powers should be "narrowed by niggardly construction," but rather given the "scope and 
elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical implications." Id. at 640. 
84. See, e.g. , Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668. Jackson's second category offers no real guidance as to 
whether the president is authorized to act or not. See Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential 
Powers: Proving a Framework for Judicial Revil!W, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 870 (1983). Consequently, the 
trend in the courts is to find congressional approval through acquiescence when Congress is silent. See, 
e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), discussed infra notes 1I0-26 and accompanying text. See also 
Comment, supra note 54, at 95. 
85. See infra notes 127-45 and accom panying text. See also Comment, supra note 54, at 95. 
86. This is the scope-of-inherent-powers approach. 
87. See infra notes 91-126 and accompanying text. Ironically, the concurrence addressed implied 
congressional acquiescence to inherent presidential powers rather than the congressional delegation of 
power. For further discussion of the delegation-of-powers approach, see infra notes 91-126 and 
accompanying text. 
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the president's actions when there is a "systematic unbroken executive practice, 
long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and never before questioned."HB In 
subsequent decisions, courts have used Frankfurter's test to find that Congress 
has acquiesced in the executive's interpretation of enabling legislation,H9 thereby 
finding an implied congressional delegation.90 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TESTS FOR IMPLIED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 
A. Delegation of Powers Approach 
The Supreme Court elaborated on Justice Frankfurter's standard for deter-
mining "implied congressional delegation through acquiescence" in Kent v. Dul-
les 91 and Zemel v. Rusk .92 The Kent case arose from a challenge to the Secretary of 
State's authority to withhold passports from persons with communist affilia-
tion.93 Kent, a member of the Communist Party, claimed that the right to travel 
can be regulated only by Congress and not by the executive. 94 The U.S. govern-
ment responded that Congress, in the 1926 Passport Act,95 granted the Secretary 
discretion over the issuance of passports.96 Because a constitutionally protected 
individual right97 was involved, the Court narrowly construed the legislative 
grant of authority for passport issuance and held that Congress had not dele-
gated such authority to the executive.98 The Court found that a mere grant of 
discretion over passport issuance does not delegate this authority to the execu-
tive. Rather, Congress must acquiesce to the criteria the Secretary uses in exercis-
ing his discretion. 99 The Court held there are only two ways Congress can 
delegate authority to the president. It can do it explicitly, or by lack of 
objection to a "substantial and consistent administrative practice."'oo The Court 
concluded that the State Department's practice with respect to withholding 
88. Youngstoum Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
89. See infra notes 91-126 and accompanying text. 
90. Congress implies a delegation of power by acquiescing to the president's interpretation of an 
enabling statute. See also Agee, 453 U.S. at 291. See also infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
91. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). 
92. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 
93. Kent, 357 U.S. at 117-18. 
94. Id. at 129. 
95. Ch. 772,44 Stat. 8871 (1926) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2119 (1976». 
96. /d. 
97. The ~ight to travel is protected under the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
98. Kent, 357 U.S. at 129. 
99. Id. at 125. Congress must approve of the secretary's policy of withholding passports on the 
grounds of political affiliation. The Court stated that the key factor is the manner in which the 
secretary's discretion is exercised, not the mere fact that he has discretion. Id. 
100. /d. at 125. The "substantial practice" test is essentially the same as Frankfurter's "systematic 
unbroken practice" test. The only difference is that the Kent test is for implied delegation through 
acquiescence whereas Frankfurter's test is for implied approval of presidential power through acquies-
cence. 
1985] EXECUTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS 191 
passports from communists was too "scattered and inconsistent" to pass this 
test. IO[ 
The cases after Kent show a gradual lowering of the standard needed to find a 
congressional delegation, thus giving the executive branch greater freedom over 
foreign affairs. 102 For example, the Court in Zemel v. Rusk held that the Secretary 
of State had the authority to restrict travel to Cuba.103 The Zemel Court cited 
Curtiss-Wright in support of the proposition that "Congress - in giving the 
executive authority over matters of foreign affairs - must of necessity paint with 
a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic areas." 104 For this reason, 
a specific grant of authority is not as necessary in foreign affairs as in domestic 
affairs. lOS The Zemel Court held that the executive's interpretation of the 
Passport Act must be given great weight. [06 Moreover, Congress' failure to repeal 
or revise the Act in spite of such administrative interpretation could be held to 
constitute persuasive evidence that Congress acquiesced in the executive's in-
terpretation. [07 Since Congress had not objected to the executive's restrictions on 
travel in either the 1926 or the 1952 Passport Acts, the Court felt Congress had 
intended to grant the president this power. [08 Thus, the Zemel Court lowered the 
requirements of the "substantial practice" test of Kent. [09 
The Supreme Court further lowered this standard in Haig v. AgeeYo Phillip 
101. /d. at 128. 
102. See Comment, supra note 54, at 98-104. 
103. Zemel v. Rusk, 318 U.S. I, 3 (1964). 
104. /d. at 17. The Court also referred to the necessity of greater executive discretion in foreign 
affairs, "because of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and 
the fact that the executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, 
evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature." ld. 
105. ld. 
106. ld. at 11. 
107. ld. 
108. /d. at 12. The Court noted many instances in which the president exercised his power to restrict 
travel, including the State Department's restrictions on travel to Belgium in 1915, to Germany and 
Austria prior to 1922, to the USSR prior to 1923, to Ethiopia in 1935, to Spain in 1936, to China in 
1937, to Europe in 1939, to Yugoslavia in 1946-1950, to Hungary in 1949-1951 and after 1951, to 
Czechoslovakia after 1951, to Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, and the USSR in 1952, to North 
Korea and Vietnam in 1955, and to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria in 1956.ld. The Zemel Court's 
finding of a substantial and consistent practice of travel restrictions contradicts the Kent Court's holding 
that only two categories for restriction of passports - citizenship and illegal conduct - constitute a 
substantial administrative practice from which the Court could infer congressional acquiescence. The 
Zemel Court distinguished its holding by noting that the Kent Court limited its examination to practices 
that involved distinctions based on individual characteristics. Id. at 13. Justice Goldberg dissented, 
stating that the administration's practice in Kent was more substantial and consistent than the adminis-
tration's practice in Zemel. ld. at 36 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
109. Unlike the Kent Court, the Zemel Court did not find an abridgment of Zemel's constitutional 
right to travel and thus did not interpret the 1926 Passport Act as narrowly as the Kent Court. Id. at 14. 
The Court distinguished Zemel from Kent. Zemel involved a travel restriction based on foreign policy 
considerations affecting all citizens. Kent, on the other hand, involved a denial of the applicant'S 
passport because of the applicant's political beliefs. ld. at 12. 
110. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent noted that the Agee Court was 
lowering the Kent-Zemel standard. ld. at 314 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Agee, an ex-CIA agent, had begun a campaign to expose CIA agents and to 
interfere with covert CIA activity throughout the world." 1 Because of his posi-
tion with the CIA, Agee possessed enough information about the CIA's covert 
operations to severely damage the United States' intelligence gathering ability. 112 
In December, 1979, the Secretary of State revoked Agee's passport on the 
ground that his activities were causing or likely to cause serious damage to the 
national security or foreign policy of the United States. 113 Agee brought suit 
challenging the Secretary's action as outside the scope of Congress' delegation to 
the executive in the 1926 Passport Act. I 14 The District Court"·> and the Court of 
Appeals" 6 granted Agee's motion for summary judgment. The lower courts 
interpreted the Kent and Zemel opinions as requiring a "substantial and consistent 
administrative practice" before congressional silence can imply authorization of 
the executive's interpretation of an act.1I7 They reasoned that passport refusals 
for national security reasons were too few to constitute a substantial and consis-
tent administrative practice. IIH 
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the lower courts and found implied 
congressional authorization for the Secretary of State to revoke passports for 
national security reasons. 119 The Court stated that the judicial branch should 
defer to a consistent administrative construction of the statute unless there is a 
compelling indication that the construction is wrong. 120 Citing Curtiss-Wright, the 
Court noted that the judicial branch should be especially deferential to the 
executive's construction of a statute when foreign policy and national security 
issues are involved.121 The Court then argued that a consistent administrative 
policy which exercises the challenged authority would satisfy the Kent-Zemel 
standard. 12 " As a result, the Court was able to find that Congress had delegated 
authority to the president by failing to object to the Secretary's policy of revoking 
Ill. Id. at 283. 
112. /d. at 284. The Court also noted Agee could endanger the lives of undercover agents. Id. 
113. The Secretary revoked Agee's passport pursuant to 22 C.F.R. 51.70(b)(4), 51.71(a) (1979), 
which state in relevant parts: 
§ 51.70(b) Denial of Passports. A passport may be refused in any case in which: ... (4) The 
Secretary determines that the national's activities abroad are causing or likely to cause serious 
damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States. 
§ 51.71(a) Revocation or Restriction of Passports. A passport may be revoked, restricted or limited 
where: (a) The national would not be entitled to issuance of a new passport under § 51.70. 
This administrative regulation was derived from the 1926 Passport Act. 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1976). 
1l4. Agee, 453 U.S. at 287. 
115. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D. D.C. 1980). 
116. Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
117. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 732; Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 87. 
118. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. at 731-32; Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d at 87. 
119. Agee, 453 U.S. at 305. 
120. Id. at 291. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 303. 
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passports for national security reasons.I~3 The Court held that it would be 
anomalous to fault the government because there were few occasions to exercise 
the announced policy and practice.'~~ Thus, the Court rejected the previous 
interpretations of the Kent-Zemel test which required a substantial and consistent 
administrative practice and adopted a new test which only requires a substantial 
and consistent administrative policy .I~.; 
The Supreme Court uses this test to implement its "delegation-of-powers 
approach." Under this approach, the Court will find a congressional delegation 
of power to the president unless Congress expressly objects to the president's 
exercise of that power. The Court uses the delegation approach only in cases 
involving issues of foreign affairs. Accordingly, the Court is more likely to find a 
congressional delegation of power to the president in foreign affairs than III 
domestic matters.I~6 
B. Test for Implied Congressional Acquiescence to Inherent Presidential Powers: The 
Scope-oi-Power Approach 
The ease with which courts can find congressional delegation under the Agee 
test allows them to avoid addressing the scope-of-inherent-powers question. 
Consequently, courts have rarely used the powers approach delineated in 
Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence. 127 A recent decision, Dames & Moore v. 
Regan ,12" is the major case utilizing the test enunciated in Jackson's concurrence. 
The Dames & Moore case arose from challenges by U.S. citizens to the power of 
the Carter and Reagan Administrations to enter into an agreement with the 
Iranian government, nullifying the claims of U.S. citizens against Iran in ex-
change for the return of fifty-two U.S. citizens held hostage by the Iranian 
governmentY9 In implementing the hostage agreement, President Reagan re-
voked previously granted prejudgment licenses,'3o issued orders nullifying U.S. 
interests in Iranian assets, suspended U.S. claims against Iran, and transferred 
123. Id. at 306. 
124. /d. at 303. 
125. /d. See also Note, Separatiun of Powers: Cungressiunal Acquiescence to Executive Discretiun in Foreign 
Affairs, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 868,871 (1982). This interpretation of the Kent standard has spurred 
criticism. Brennan argued in dissent that the Kent-Zemel standard requires a substantial and consistent 
administrative practice. A policy alone would not satisfy Kent-Zemel. Agee, 453 U.S. at 314 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). See also Comment, supra note 54, at 104 n.74. 
126. Comment, supra note 54, at 106. 
127. /d. at 99. 
128. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
129. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 666-67. 
130. Prejudgment licenses were issued by the Carter administration. These licenses provided for 
attachments of Iranian property in the United States. The licenses, however, could be revoked at any 
time. 31 C.F.R. § 535.805. President Carter also allowed judicial proceedings to begin but did not allow 
the entry of any judgment or decree against Iran. 31 C.F.R. § 535.504(a) (1980). 
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the claims to an international arbitral tribunal.'31 Justice Rehnquist found that 
Congress explicitly authorized the president to nullify U.S. claims against for-
eign governments and to transfer Iranian assets in the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).132 
The Court, however, could not find explicit congressional authorization for 
the president to suspend U.S. claims against Iran.133 Relying on Congress' 
enactment of the IEEP A and the Hostage Act,134 the Court reasoned that al-
though the IEEPA did not grant explicit approval of the President's actions, it 
did indicate a congressional willingness to allow the President broad discretion in 
foreign affairs.130 Also rejected was the proposition that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA)136 implied a congressional desire to remove the presi-
dent's ability to settle private claims by executive agreement. 137 More specific 
congressional disapproval of the president's action is required before the Court 
will negate implied congressional approval. 13B 
The Dames & Moore Court indicated that in matters of foreign affairs and 
national security only direct congressional disapproval would invalidate a presi-
dential action. 139 Moreover, the Court further explained that "[l]egislation 
closely related to the question of the [p]resident's authority in a particular case 
which evidences legislative intent to accord the [p]resident's broad discretion 
may be considered to 'invite' measures of ' independent [p ]residential responsibil-
ity.' "140 
One commentator has argued that the Agee and Dames & Moore Courts have 
131. Exec. Order Nos. 12276-12285, 46 Fed. Regs. 7913-31. See also Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. al 
665-66 (discussion of IEEPA). 
132. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675. While admitting that the legislative history of the IEEPA 
showed a congressional attempt to limit the president's power to vest, the Court refused to ignore the 
"plain language of the statute in favor of legislative history." Id. at 672-73. Thus, "although ... the 
IEEPA does not give the [p ]resident the power to 'vest' or to take tide to the assets, it does not follow that 
the [p]resident is not authorized under ... [the]IEEPA ... to otherwise permanently dispose of the 
assets in Ihe manner done here." Id. at 672 n.5. See also infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
133. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675. The Court rejected both the IEEPA and the 1868 Hostage Act 
as sources of explicit congressional approval. The IEEPA was rejected because it dealt with rights 
exercised against a foreign country's assets, not personal claims meant to establish liability and fix 
damages. Id. The 1868 Hostage Act was rejected because it was concerned with providing the president 
with authority to protect U.S. citizens abroad from forced repatriation. /d. at 676. 
134. See supra note 133. 
135. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. The Dames & Moore Court further held that failure of Congress 
to deny specific authority does not, "especially in the areas of foreign policy and national security, imply 
[c]ongressional disapproval of [the] action." Id. at 678 (quoting Agee, 453 U.S. at 291). 
136. Foreign Soverign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1984). 
137. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 684. Justice Rehnquist stated that the FSIA should be read 
narrowly. The purpose of the act was to codify the contemporary concepts of immunity and to remove 
the president's authority to make binding determinations of the sovereign immunity of foreign states. 
Id. at 685. 
138. Id. at 678. See also Note, supra note 125, at 877. 
139. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677. See also Note, supra note 125, at 877. 
140. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 637). 
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defined away Justice jackson's second category.!4! Under this delegation-of.-
powers approach, a court following Dames & Moore or Agee could find con-
gressional delegation or approval of presidential power if Congress had knowl-
edge of the asserted authority and the opportunity to act on that knowledge.!42 
The role given Congress in Kent, Zemel, and Agee is very different from the role 
of Congress in Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence and in Dames & Moore. 
In the line of cases culminating in Agee, !43 the Court found that Congress had not 
acquiesced to the president's use of inherent powers. Rather, the Court found 
that Congress had implicitly delegated its own powers to the president.!44 In 
Youngstown and Dames & Moore, however, the Court found that Congress had not 
delegated its own powers but had authorized the president's use of his own 
inherent power. In Agee, Congress acquiesced to the president's interpretation of 
how much power Congress had delegated. In Dames & Moore, Congress ac-
quiesced to the president's interpretation of how much power he held under the 
Constitution. The former deals with the delegation of power by Congress and 
the latter deals with the scope of executive power in the Constitution. 
This distinction between Agee and Dames & Moore is particularly important 
when dealing with an executive's failure to follow congressionally established 
procedure. If Congress acquiesces to the president's inherent power, then the 
president's failure to follow procedure is less important. Conversely, if Congress 
delegates power to the president, the president's failure to follow the procedure 
Congress established could be grounds for invalidating the presidential act. !45 
The following section analyzes the effect of the executive's failure to follow 
procedure under the delegation-of-power and scope-of-inherent-powers ap-
proaches. 
V. THE EFFECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE 
A. The Effect oj Failure to Follow Procedure: The Delegation-oFPowers Approach 
When Congress delegates power to the executive and prescribes a procedure 
for the exercise of that power, the executive's failure to follow the established 
procedure may lead a court to invalidate the executive's action. 146 The Supreme 
141. Comment, supra note 54, at 112. See also supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
142. Comment, supra note 54, at 112. 
143. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Zemel v. Rusk. 381 U.S. 1(1965). 
144. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686, which concluded that "the President was authorized to 
suspend pending claims pursuant to Executive Order No. 12294." /d. The advantage of this holding was 
that if the Court found the delegation of power 'to the executive, it did not have to consider the problem 
of inherent presidential power. 
145. See infra notes 146-56. 
146. Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues and Policy 
Lessons of These Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 1,97 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Moyer & 
Mabry]. 
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Court has held in several cases that agency action taken without following 
prescribed procedures is null and void. 141 The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)14~ also invalidates executive action for failure to follow congressional 
procedure. 149 Section 706(2)(d) of the APA provides that the reviewing court 
shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions 
found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law."15o The policy 
of the APA regarding failure to follow procedure, however, can only be used by 
analogy because executive actions regarding military or foreign affairs are 
exempt from the APA.151 
Despite the inapplicability of the AP A, other arguments support the proposi-
tion that Congress cannot be held to have authorized the president'S action when 
the president failed to follow the procedure Congress prescribed. 152 Several 
courts have held that Congress cannot be held to have acquiesced to executive 
actions when the president failed to follow the procedures established by Con-
gress. In Wald v. Regan 153 and United States v. Frade ,154 the First and Eleventh 
Circuit Courts held that the president'S failure to follow congressionally estab-
lished procedure moves the president'S action from the first of Jackson'S catego-
ries, in which the executive acts with the will of Congress, to the third, in which 
the executive acts contrary to the will of Congress. l55 Actions in the third 
category can be upheld only by disabling Congress from acting in the field. l56 
B. The Consumers Union Case 
The effect of the executive's failure to follow procedure was discussed in some 
detail in Judge Leventhal's dissent in the District of Columbia Circuit Court case 
147. See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (discharge of foreign service officer invalid 
because not effected pursuant to State Department regulations); United States ex rei. Accardi v. 
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1953) (denial of application for suspension of deportation order invalid 
because Board of Immigration Appeals failed to exercise its own discretion as required by existing 
regulations). See also Gardner v. F.C.C., 530 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (FCC denial of petition 
for reconsideration invalid because Commission failed to provide personal notice of decisions pursuant 
to the established practice); Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("an administrative 
agency is bound not only by the precepts of its governing statute but also by those incorporated into its 
own regulations."); Cf Brady v. U.S., 515 F.2d 1383 (1975) (discharge of servicemen invalid because Air 
Force failed to follow procedural regulations). 
148. Ch. 324,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1982)). 
149. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(d) (1982). 
150. [d. Under the APA, a court may overturn an agency action taken without observance of 
prescribed procedure only when there is prejudicial error. [d. The rule of prejudicial error states that 
only error which harms or prejudices the plaintiff will be grounds for setting aside the action. 
151. 5 U.S.C. § 9(1) (1982). 
152. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 146, at 120. 
153. Wald, 708 F.2d at 800, rev'd on other grounds, 52 U.S.L.W. 4966 (U.S. June 26, 1984). 
154. Frade, 709 F.2d at 1402. 
155. [d. 
156. /d. See aLm supra. note 80 and accompanying text. 
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of Consumers Union of the United States Inc. v. Kissinger .157 The Consumers Union case 
arose from actions taken by the executive in response to the dramatic increase in 
steel imports during the 1960's.l58 The government perceived this increase in 
steel imports as a threat to the domestic steel industry, the national economy, and 
national security. 159 Congress took no action to impose mandatory import restric-
tions on steel due to the fear of possible retaliation by other countries under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). [60 Instead, the U.S. State 
Department negotiated a voluntary reduction of steel imports into the United 
States with the foreign steel producers. 16[ The Consumers Union brought suit 
against the United States claiming the agreement was prejudicial to the interests 
of consumers and that the executive did not have the power to negotiate such an 
agreement. [62 
In order to decide whether the president had the power to negotiate the 
agreement, the Circuit Court was first required to determine whether the ar-
rangement was an internationally binding executive agreement. 163 Judge McGo-
wan, writing for a majority of the court, found the arrangement to be voluntary, 
and thus not an internationally binding agreement. 164 Since no binding agree-
ment had been concluded, Judge McGowan did not need to consider the execu-
tive's competence to make such binding agreements. [65 
In his dissent, Judge Leventhal argued that the agreement was internationally 
binding and thus he addressed the question of the executive's competence to 
make this agreement. [66 A crucial factor in determining the executive's compe-
tence to conclude the agreement was that President Nixon, in making the 
agreement, had ignored certain procedures which Congress had prescribed in 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.167 While recognizing that the president does 
have some inherent power in the field of foreign affairs, [68 Leventhal argued 
157. 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
158. [d. at 138. Steel imports increased tenfold from 1958 to 1968. /d. 
159. The D.C. Circuit noted that having a steel industry strong enough to supply a war machine is 
considered crucial to national defense. [d. 
160. General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A3, T.l.A.S. No. 1700,55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
161. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger. 506 F.2d 136. 138 (1974). 
162. ld. at 139. 
163. [d. at 143. 
164. Judge McGowan found the arrangements non-enforceable and that the executive had no 
authority to compel observance. /d. 
165. [d. The president is free to suggest a reduction in imports to foreign producers. If producers 
voluntarily choose to accept this agreement. there is no question of executive competence as the action 
came from the foreign producers and not from the president. 
166. [d. at 146 (Leventhal. J.. dissenting). 
167. ld. at 148. 158. See also 9 U.S.C. § 1801 (1982). The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 made the 
exercise of executive authority over import restraints dependent on public ventilation of the issues and 
on the right of comment by affected interests. [d. at 1862. 
168. Consumers Union. 506 F.2d at 148. (Leventhal. J.. dissenting). 
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that the president's power over foreign affairs cannot allow him to ignore 
congressional regulatory schemes enacted pursuant to the congressional power 
to regulate foreign commerce. 169 
Judge Leventhal utilized Justice jackson's Youngstown test to resolve the ten-
sion between the president's inherent foreign affairs power and Congress' power 
to regulate foreign commerce.17O Like Justice Jackson, Leventhal viewed the 
scope of the president's powers as expanding or contracting depending on their 
conjunction or disjunction with the will of Congress. 171 Leventhal argued, how-
ever, that the president is foreclosed from acting independently in an area in 
which Congress has occupied the field by enacting legislation. 172 Thus, unless the 
president acts in conformity with the procedures established by Congress, his 
actions fall into Jackson's third category173 and his executive powers are at their 
"lowest ebb. "174 Reviewing the legislative history of the Trade Expansion Act and 
the history of congressional reaction to prior presidential action in trade regula-
tion, Leventhal found that Congress had occupied the field of regulation of 
imports and had not acquiesced to any procedural shortcomings by the execu-
tive.175 Accordingly, the president's actions fell within Jackson's third category. 
Since Congress has particularly strong authority in the regulation of foreign 
commerce, the president is foreclosed from regulating foreign commerce in a 
manner incompatible with the procedural requirements imposed by Congress. 176 
Judge Leventhal, however, did not ignore the judiciary's traditional policy of 
allowing presidential discretion in foreign affairs. 177 While he would have held 
against the executive's exercise of power, Leventhal stated that he would not 
have invalidated the agreement. 178 Rather, he would have directed the president 
169. /d. at 148-49. (Leventhal, j., dissenting). The Constitution grants Congress the power to 
regulate foreign commerce. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 3. 
170. 506 F.2d at 148-49 (Leventhal, j., dissenting). 
171. [d. at 148 (Leventhal, j., dissenting). Judge Leventhal argued: 
[T]he proper inquiry, is whether the executive action in obtaining the agreements for steel 
import restrictions comports with the [c]ongressional program for foreign trade, or whether 
Congress, by occupation of the field of foreign import restraints, has precluded the [p]resi-
dent's taking action on an independent basis without complying with the standards and 
procedures provided by Congress as a condition of executive effectuation of import restraints. 
[d. 
172. /d. 
173. [d. See also Wald, 708 F.2d at 800; Frade, 709 F.2d at 1387; United States v. Guy Capps, 204 F.2d 
655 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that since Congress had occupied the field in import controls of seed 
potatoes, the president was foreclosed from independent activity). 
174. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 149. (Leventhal, j., dissenting). 
175. /d. at 153-57. Judge Leventhal noted that Cvngress had considered but refused to authorize the 
president the power to impose restraints without observing procedural requirements. [d. at 152 n.ll. 
Leventhal also noted that at no time after the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, 19 U .S.c. § 1862 (1982), did 
Congress knowingly acquiesce to the executive's actions to impose import restraints without following 
procedural requirements. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 156-57 (Leventhal, J., dissenting). 
176. Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at 149 (Leventhal, j., dissenting). 
177. /d. at 148, 158. 
178. [d. at 158. 
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to adhere to the correct procedure. 179 Citing Curtiss-Wright, Judge Leventhal 
explained that it is appropriate, "in a matter so laced with delicate international 
relationships, for the court to shun a 'procrustean rigidity' in deference to 
possible clarification or correction by the [p]resident and Congress together."180 
Judge Leventhal's dissent provides a possible test for determining whether a 
court should invalidate presidential action for failure to follow a congressionally 
prescribed procedure. A court may look at the comprehensiveness of the legisla-
tion to establish whether Congress has occupied the field. In addition, the court 
could examine congressional acquiescence to past presidential action in the area. 
If the court finds Congress has occupied the field, the president must follow the 
statutory procedure that Congress prescribes. If he fails to do this, his actions fall 
within Justice Jackson'S third category, and the court must disable Congress 
from acting in this area before it can support the president's actions. 
VI. ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS OPEN TO A COURT IN RESOLVING THE SITUATION 
PRESENTED IN THE Wald CASE: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN 
The Court in reviewing Wald was faced with the tension between providing the 
president flexibility in foreign affairs and maintaining checks on the executive. lSI 
The Wald-type case is unique because the tension cannot be resolved by the 
Court's finding that the president was delegated authority because he failed to 
follow congressional procedure. 182 Consideration of the various options open to 
the Court in grappling with this problem illustrates the difficult questions the 
Court was faced with. 
If the Court were to follow Curtiss-Wright in resolving Wald, it would have 
created new exclusive inherent executive power. 183 The creation of new presi-
dential powers, however, would upset the system of checks and balances. Tradi-
tionally, courts have provided the president greater flexibility without addres-
sing the issue of inherent powers by finding a congressional delegation of power 
to the president. 184 Without the grandfather clause, however, the facts of the 
Wald case foreclose this solution. In the cases in which the Supreme Court found 
implied congressional authorization, Congress had acquiesced to past presiden-
tial actions in the area and had not enacted any contrary legislation. ls5 In Wald, 
Congress' passage of the IEEPA indicates that Congress intended to grant the 
president power under the IEEPA only when he followed the procedures pre-
179. Id. 
180. /d. 
181. Wald. 708 F.2d at 800. 
182. The executive is acting under authority granted by Congress. yet the president has failed to 
follow the procedure Congress had established. /d. at 796. 
183. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text. 
185. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79. See also supra notes 110-26. 
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scribed by the statute. IB6 Thus, in the Wald case, it would have been very difficult 
for the Court to find a delegation of power to the executive without resorting to 
the grandfather clause. 
If the Court found that the President's restrictions on travel to Cuba were 
neither authorized by a congressional delegation nor under the president's 
exclusive inherent powers, it could still reach its desired conclusion by using its 
scope-of-inherent-powers approach articulated in Justice Jackson's Youngstown 
concurrence. If the Court used the scope-of-inherent-powers approach rather 
than the delegation approach, it would not have had to invalidate the President's 
actions because of his procedural shortcomings. ls7 
Under the scope-of-inherent-powers approach, the Court would decide in 
which of Justice jackson's three categories President Reagan's actions belonged 
when he failed to follow the procedure set out in the IEEPA. The President's 
failure to follow congressionally prescribed procedure would preclude his action 
from Jackson's first category. To be in that category, the president must act 
pursuant to the express or implied authorization of Congress. l88 Moreover, 
Congress has not acquiesced to any past presidential actions which ignored the 
procedural requirements of the IEEPA.189 
The challenged action, however, does not clearly fall into Justice Jackson'S 
third category either. The President's actions in Wald did not completely con-
travene congressional intent. Youngstown is the classic example of presidential 
action in the third category. The facts in Wald differ from Youngstown substan-
tially. In Youngstown, Congress specifically refused to grant the President power 
to seize private property to end labor disputes, even in times of national emer-
gency.190 In Wald, however, Congress granted the President the power but 
established a procedure for its use. There is a distinction between a situation 
such as Youngstown, in which Congress specifically denies the substantive power, 
and a situation such as that in Wald, where Congress specifically grants the 
substantive power but prescribes a procedure which the president fails to follow. 
Judge Leventhal's dissent in the Consumers Union case provides some guidance 
as to whether the President's actions in Wald should be included in Justice 
Jackson's second or third category. According to Judge Leventhal's test, the 
court should focus on how thoroughly Congress intended to occupy the field. An 
analysis of the IEEP A indicates that Congress did not intend to exclusively 
occupy the field of emergency economic powers. In fact, the IEEPA gives the 
186. See infra note 201. 
187. A court could invalidate a congressional delegation of power to the president if he fails to follow 
congressionally prescribed procedure. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text. !fa court were to 
follow the scope-of-inherent-powers approach, its finding that the president failed to follow procedure 
is only evidence of congressional disapproval. See supra notes 127-44 and accompanying text. 
188. [d. 
189. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
190. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 586. 
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president broad discretion in interpreting the procedures. 191 Accordingly, the 
Court would not need to find that the President's action in Wald falls within 
Jackson's third category. 
This leaves the second category of the Youngstown test for the challenged 
action. 192 Actions taken in the second category are the most difficult to analyze 
because there is little judicial guidance in this area. 193 Justice Jackson suggested 
that, in this area, congressional inertia or indifference may sometimes "enable if 
191. The IEEPA grants the president the authority to investigate, regulate, and prohibit all foreign 
currency transactions, all im ports and exports of currency and securities, and all banking transactions 
that involve a foreign interest. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). The president is also granted the 
power to impose foreign property controls. Id. at § 1702(a)(l)(b). 
In addition, the IEEPA establishes procedures and conditions for the exercise of emergency eco-
nomic power by the president. Before using the emergency powers established under the IEEPA, the 
president must first declare a national emergency. Id. at § 1701(a) (Supp. IV 1980). The IEEPA also 
requires that the president consult with Congress "if possible" before invoking the powers under the 
Act. /d. at § 1703(a) (Supp. IV 1980). In addition, the president must transmit a report to Congress 
detailing the circumstances surrounding the emergency, the nature of the threat involved, the au-
thorities to be exercised, the reasons for the exercise of these authorities, and the countries involved. 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (1976). 
There is conflicting evidence in the IEEPA of Congress' intent to "occupy the field" in the exercise of 
emergency economic power. Its motivation in passing the IEEPA was to end perceived abuses of 
executive power under the controlling statute, section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA). 
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976) (Current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980». 
Congress, however, wanted to preserve the president'S flexibility to respond to international crises. 
Consequently, the IEEPA establishes procedures and conditions for the use of emergency economic 
power, yet it grants the president broad discretion in the interpretation of those conditions and 
procedures. For example, the president determines how grave a threat must be to justify the declaration 
of an emergency. See Note, Presidential Emergency PtnJJers Related to International Economic Transactions: 
Congressional Recognition of Customary Authority, II VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 525 (1978). Also, since 
the IEEPA only requires prior consultation with Congress "if possible," the president has the discretion 
to determine when and with which members of Congress prior consultation is possible. Congress' 
concern with providing the president flexibility and broad discretion in interpreting the procedures and 
conditions for the use of emergency powers suggests that Congress did not intend to occupy the field. 
The fact that the drafters of the IEEPA did not feel the president's power would substantially change 
from what it had been under the TWEA supports this conclusion. 123 CONGo REc. 22,455 (1977). 
Legislative intent can be more accurately analyzed when the legislative history is supplemented with 
an examination of congressional response to past presidential actions in this area. Because the IEEPA 
was passed relatively recently and is infrequently used, there is no history of congressional response to 
procedural defects in executive actions. Some support for the proposition that Congress has acquiesced 
to procedural shortcomings of the president is found from the congressional response to executive 
actions under the Export Administration Act (EAA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (Supp. IV 1980). The 
EAA involves export controls for foreign policy or national security reasons during times short of a 
declared national emergency. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402 (Supp. IV 1980). Since the EAA involves action 
during non-emergencies, its procedural requirements are more substantial than those of the IEEPA. 50 
U.S.C. app. § 2405(e) (Supp. IV 1980). The procedural requirements of the EAA, however, have been 
ignored on several occasions by the president. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 146, at 92-96. 
192. Jackson's second category is very rarely used by courts. The reason for this is that, under the 
Agee test, congressional silence regarding a past policy is construed as approval of the policy. See supra 
note 126. 
193. Note, Dames & Moore V. Regan, Congressional Power Over Foreign Affairs Held Hostage by Executive 
Agreement with Iron, 15 Loy. L. REv. 249, 283 (1982). 
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not invite measures [of] independent presidential responsibility."194 Jackson 
further explained that in this category, any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on "the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather 
than on abstract theories of law."195 Thus, in the second category, the Court 
would look at the legislative history of the IEEPA and congressional acquies-
cence to past action in order to glean congressional intent. Using the second 
category, the Court could weigh heavily the fact that the action involved a matter 
of foreign affairs in which the executive has dominated. 196 
Under the scope-of-inherent-powers approach the Court could probably have 
upheld the President's action for the following reasons: the action involved 
foreign affairs, an area in which the president has traditionally had broad 
discretion; 197 the legislative history of the IEEP A suggests that Congress in-
tended the president to have broad discretion in this area; 198 Congress has 
traditionally supported the president's substantive actions in this area; 199 and the 
IEEPA does not clearly show a congressional intent to occupy the field. 20o In 
determining whether to uphold a president's action when he failed to follow 
congressionally prescribed procedure, the Court should have considered the 
level of congressional intent to occupy the field, the importance of the proce-
dure,201 and, most importantly, whether the action involved foreign affairs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has explored the difficulties the judiciary has when presented 
with the issue of whether to invalidate a president's action in foreign affairs when 
the president has failed to follow the procedure prescribed by Congress. In 
deciding this issue, courts try to accommodate the polar goals of providing the 
president flexibility in foreign affairs while maintaining constitutional checks on 
executive power. Courts have refrained from creating inherent executive power 
for fear of upsetting the constitutional balance of power. 
The courts' traditional method of resolving this dilemma has been to find a 
congressional delegation of the disputed power to the president. After Haig v. 
Agee, congressional silence in the face of a consistent administrative policy will be 
regarded as implied congressional delegation. 
194. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 637. 
195. [d. 
196. Jackson would consider the president's dominance in foreign affairs to be one of the "impon-
derables" discussed in the second category. 
197. See supra notes 32-63 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
199. See HENKIN, supra note 1, at 119. 
200. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
201. Consumers Unilm, 506 F.2d at 148. For example, the IEEPA's requirement that the president 
publish actions taken under the IEEPA in the Federal Register is a procedural requirement and thus 
less important than the requirement that he declare a national emergency before using § 203 power. 50 
U.S.C. § 1702 (1977). 
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When the president fails to follow congressionally prescribed procedure, how-
ever, the court cannot implement the delegation-of-powers approach. A second 
option for the court in resolving this dilemma is to adopt the flexible approach to 
inherent power found in Justice Jackson'S concurrence in Youngstown. Under this 
analysis, Congress' approval or disapproval of the president's actions effects the 
scope of the president's inherent power, rather than the delegation of Congress' 
power. 
Judge Leventhal's dissent in the Consumers Union case is useful in determining 
in which of Justice Jackson'S three categories the Wald situation belongs. Under 
Leventhal's test, a court would look at how thoroughly Congress intended to 
occupy the field of international economic power. Since Congress' intent to 
occupy the field was unclear, the President's action probably belongs in the 
second category. In the second category, the court could again consider Con-
gress' intent, and whether the case would interfere with the executive's foreign 
policy. Using this analysis, the Court in Wald could have upheld the President's 
action without resorting to the grandfather clause. 
Jonathan W. Painter 
